Logische Folgerung und paradoxes Schließen

01/03/2015 to 31/12/2018

he traditional analysis of the relation of logical consequence due to Alfred Tarski explains consequence in terms of truth. A more recent
rival view developed by Dag Prawitz aims at replacing the notion of truth with the one of proof. What is common to both approaches is the
characterization of consequence as `transmission': B is a logical consequence of A if and only if truth (resp. provability) is transmitted from A to B. The project develops an alternative conception of
consequence, which rejects the ``transmission view''. This is achieved by grounding consequence on local features of inference rules, rather
than on global properties of deduction. The local character of consequence offers the possibility to distinguish, among the proofs whose steps are all locally correct, those that are also globally valid
from those that are not. The gap between local correctness and global validity provides an original account of how each step in a paradoxicalargument may be sound, without the conclusion of the whole
argument being acceptable.